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Abstract
I investigate an innovative interaction before a market competition in a mixed duopoly,
where a state-owned firm and a private firm compete with each other. I find that although it
reduces the effort level of the state-owned firm, an agency problem can improve the expected
social welfare in some cases. I also find that setting the minimum wage level higher, which
has an effect to lower the responsibility of bureaucratic managers, can be desirable from the
viewpoint of expected social welfare in some cases.
I am grateful to Shingo Ishiguro, Toshihiro Matsumura, Keizo Mizuno, Dan Sasaki, Noriyuki Yanagawa, and the participants of
the seminars conducted at The University of Tokyo for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Citation: Miyazawa, Shinjiro, (2008) "Innovative Interaction in Mixed Market: An Effect of Agency Problem in State-Owned
Firm." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 10 pp. 1-8
Submitted: March 12, 2008.  Accepted: March 21, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-08L30001A.pdf1 Introduction
The agency problem due to bureaucratic managements is one of the most important problems
in many countries. People often criticize the bureaucratic management for its inefﬁciency and
then some of them request to privatize state-owned ﬁrms in order to improve the efﬁciency of
management. In fact, the Liberal Democratic Party, which attached considerable emphasis to
privatizing the national postal mail, savings, and insurance services in order to improve the
efﬁciency of management, achieved a signiﬁcant victory in the 2005 elections to the House of
Representatives in Japan.
Although eliminating the agency problem can improve the efﬁciency of management in a
state-owned ﬁrm as likely as not, it also affects the managerial incentive of private competitors
in the mixed market, where a state-owned ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm compete with each other. I
investigate an innovative interaction before a market competition in a mixed duopoly. I ﬁnd
that although it reduces the investment level of the state-owned ﬁrm, the agency problem due
to the bureaucratic management can improve the expected social welfare in some cases.
I also investigate the effect of a bureaucratic system concerning a minimum wage level.
Ordinarily, setting minimum wage level higher is considered as a system for guaranteeing a
lowest life level ex-post. However, it also has an effect to tighten the constraint of minimum
wage and cause the agency problem more likely. Therefore, when a slight degree of agency
problem improves the expected social welfare, a positive level of minimum wage is optimal
even from the ex-ante viewpoint. It is often considered that managers in certain state-owned
ﬁrms are less responsible to bad performances. My result implies, however, that the less
responsibility can be desirable from the viewpoint of expected social welfare.
Needless to say, several studies investigate agency problems in state-owned ﬁrms. De Fraja
(1993) studies the problem using a complete contracting approach. He shows that in a good
state of the world, state-owned ownership always leads to a higher degree of productive efﬁ-
ciency. This is because the beneﬁt of enhancing productive efﬁciency is higher for the public
owner than for the private owner. Schmidt (1996), on the other hand, analyzes the problem
by employing an incomplete contracting approach. In his study, he supposes that the govern-
ment cannot offer any long-term contingent contracts. Given this assumption, although public
ownership always leads to allocative efﬁciency in any technological environment, it cannot
induce the enhancement of productive efﬁciency. Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Cor-
neo and Rob (2003) analyze the problems by using multi-task models. Hart, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997) show that incentive contracts increase the cost-reducing investments but lower
the quality of services. Corneo and Rob (2003), on the other hand, show that public owners
offer less intensive incentive contracts when the agents derive a private beneﬁt from one task
(cooperative task). Although these studies examine various effects on both ex-ante investment
and ex-post allocation, they do not consider the effects on strategic interactions between public
and private sectors.
Analyses on the strategic interaction in mixed markets have been a popular subject in
recent years.1 The most remarkable aspect in a mixed market is that even when the goal of
1The studies on mixed markets originated with the works of Merrill and Schneider (1966) and Harris and
Wiens (1980). In recent years, the strategic interactions in the mixed market have been analyzed in various con-
texts. For example, Matsushima and Matsumura (2003) analyze the location-setting pattern in a mixed oligopoly
market, Fjell and Heywood (2004) analyze optimal subsidy levels and effects of privatization of the state-owned
1the state-owned ﬁrm is to maximize the social welfare, the state-owned ﬁrm’s decision can be
suboptimal in the sense that a change of the decision can improve the social welfare through
a strategic interaction between the state-owned and private ﬁrms. It follows that providing a
commitment device to change the decision can improve the social welfare.2 In my study, the
agency problem derived from limited liability of bureaucrats works as a device.3
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I formulate the basic model.
Next, I investigate the effect of the agency problem in a state-owned ﬁrm and that of limited
liability in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I provide the concluding remarks.
2 Basic Model
Consider a mixed market where a state-owned ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0) competes with a private ﬁrm (ﬁrm
1). The government assigns a bureaucrat to the manager of ﬁrm 0, while a private owner
manages ﬁrm 1 directly. Each of the bureaucratic manager and the private owner decides
his effort (or innovative investment) level e 2 [0; ¯ e], which is measured in terms of the units
of disutility he incurs and is not observed by the others, before the market competition. Let
e0 and e1 be the effort levels of the bureaucratic manager and private owner, respectively.
Each of them acquires a good technology with probability v(e) independent of the other’s
effort level. Impose an ordinary set of assumptions as follows; (i) v0 ¸ 0 and v00 < 0 for
all e 2 [0; ¯ e], (ii) v(0) = 0 and v(¯ e) = 1, (iii) v0(0) = +1 and v0(¯ e) = 0, and (iv) v00 is
continuous. The technological environments in the market competition are divided into four
combinations: gg, gb, bg, and bb. For example, gb indicates that the bureaucratic manager
acquires the good technology and the private owner does not. Every valuation depending on
the environments is expressed with a superscript s 2 fgg;gb;bg;bbg. Before the inputs of
efforts, the government offers a wage contract contingent on the technology the bureaucratic
manager acquires, (wg;wb). Assume that the bureaucrat can receive w units of utility and
is protected by limited liability. Further, assume that the government cannot disclose and
commit the contract. This assumption, in effect, implies that the government and the private
owner decide their (targeted) effort levels, simultaneously.
The bureaucratic manager maximizes the expected wage income net of his effort level and
the private owner maximizes the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 net of his effort level, while the
government maximizes the expected social welfare, which is the sum of consumer’s surplus
ﬁrm in a mixed oligopoly market, and Chang (2005) analyzes optimal trade and privatization policies in an inter-
national duopoly where a state-owned ﬁrm competes with a more efﬁcient foreign ﬁrm. Matsushima and Mat-
sushima (2004) and Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) analyze cost-reduction and R&D competition in a mixed
duopoly market, although they do not consider an agency problem in a state-owned ﬁrm.
2Several studies use the aspect of mixed market in their investigation. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and
Matsumura (1998), for example, use it in the quantity-setting competition and show that privatization in mixed
oligopoly and partial privatization in a mixed duopoly, respectively, can improve social welfare. Ishibashi and
Matsumura (2006) use the effect in R&D competition and show that committing less investment by imposing a
budget constraint improves social welfare.
3When it can commit contracts, the government uses a contract to control the equilibrium outcome. Barros
(1995) considers the contract as a strategic commitment device and shows the difference in incentive schemes
between state-owned and private ﬁrms. Although he presents insightful results concerning optimal incentive
schemes in mixed markets, he do not consider any agency problem.
2and proﬁts of both ﬁrms net of the effort levels and taxation costs for public funds.4 Assume







1 j e0;e1] ¡ e0 ¡ e1 ¡ ³fv(e0)w
g + (1 ¡ v(e0))w
bg;
where CSs and ¼s
i (i = 0;1) are the consumer’s surplus and ﬁrm i’s proﬁt, respectively, under
a technological environment of s 2 fgg;gb;bg;bbg. Note that the taxation cost for production
costs is reﬂected to the outcomes of CSs and ¼s
i (i = 0;1). Assume that attaining the good
technology improves the gross social welfare, Zs ´ CSs + ¼s
0 + ¼s
1, i.e., Zkg > Zkb and
Zgl > Zbl for any k and l in fg;bg.
The variables CSs, ¼s
0, and ¼s
1 depend on the feature of technology and the structure of
market competition, deﬁnitely. However, the following analysis on strategic effects of the in-
novativedecisionsdependson(i)whethertheprivateowner’sstrategyinthestageofinnovative
decisions is strategic substitute or implement to the government’s strategy and (ii) whether the
private owner’s strategy in the stage is under- or over-investment from the viewpoint of ex-
pected social welfare, only, not on the feature of technology and the structure of market com-
petition. Then focus on four combination cases; strategic substitutability and under-investment
(Case1), strategicsubstitutabilityandover-investment(Case2), strategiccomplementarityand
under-investment (Case 3), and strategic complementarity and over-investment (Case 4).





































Note that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed when assuming ¼
kg
1 > ¼kb
1 for any k in
fg;bg. Therefore, the private owner’s strategy is substitute (complement) to the bureaucratic
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0 ) for a k 2 fg;bg.5
4This assumption on the government’s objective follows Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey, and Tirole (1988).
5Whether the private owner’s strategy is under- or over-investment depends on the effort level in ﬁrm 0 when
the relationship between CSkg + ¼
kg
0 and CSkb + ¼kb
0 is opposite for k = g and k = b. I ignore such peculiar
cases for analytical simplicity.
33 Agency Problem Derived from Limited Liability
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where the constraints are individual rationality (IR), incentive compatibility (IC), and limited
liability (LL) constraints.6 Investigating the effect of limited liability on the equilibrium ex-
pected social welfare, I have the following result (See Appendix A.1 for a precise proof).
Proposition 1 (i) When ³ = 0, the limited liability does not affect the equilibrium expected
social welfare. (ii) When ³ > 0, the agency problem derived from limited liability could
improve the equilibrium expected social welfare in the cases of Case 1 and Case 4, while it
deﬁnitely damages the equilibrium expected social welfare in the cases of Case 2 and Case 3.
When the taxation for the wage payment is costless, the wage payment is just a transfer from
the proﬁt of ﬁrm 0 to the utility of bureaucratic manager. Therefore, the limited liability does
not cause any agency problem and then does not affect the equilibrium expected social welfare.
On the other hand, when the taxation for the wage payment is costly, the government has
an incentive to reduce the wage payment. In this case, the limited liability can cause an agency
problem, which results in reducing the targeted effort levels in ﬁrm 0 responding to any effort
levels in ﬁrm 1. However, the reduction of the targeted effort levels in ﬁrm 0 could improve the
expected social welfare for the reason below. Since the government maximizes the expected
social welfare, a slight reduction in e0 from the equilibrium level without any agency problem
keeps the expected social welfare unchanged. On the other hand, since the private owner
maximizes the expected proﬁt net of his effort level, the equilibrium effort level is ordinarily
nonidentical to the level maximizing the expected social welfare. An increase (a reduction)
in e1 improves (damages) the expected social welfare when the private owner’s strategy is
under-investment from the viewpoint of expected social welfare, and it does oppositely when
his strategy is over-investment from the viewpoint of expected social welfare. Therefore, the
reduction of the targeted effort levels in ﬁrm 0, affecting the effort levels in ﬁrm 1, damages
the expected social welfare in the case of Case 2 and Case 3, but could improve the expected
social welfare in the case of Case 1 and Case 4. I provide an example of Case 1 with specifying
the technology and the market structure in Appendix A.2.
People often criticize the “inefﬁciency” of bureaucratic managements and request to re-
form (or especially privatize) state-owned ﬁrms. It is true that the taxation costs for bureau-
cratic managements damage the expected social welfare and can cause an agency problem
in state-owned ﬁrms. However, in mixed market, the agency problem due to the bureaucratic
management affects private competitors’ decisions of innovative investment, and consequently
6The IC constraint can be written by a ﬁrst-order condition fashion as above following from the assumption
on v(e).
4improves the expected social welfare in equilibrium in some cases. Therefore, when the re-
form (or privatization) of state-owned ﬁrms is considered, this type of innovative interaction
between public and private sector should be also examined.
I have investigated the equilibrium outcomes given non-negative wage limitation. I now
consider a bureaucratic system setting a minimum wage level wmin ¸ 0. Suppose that the
government can commit any bureaucratic systems.7 Then, the LL constraints in G’s problem
are altered by
w
g ¸ wmin andw
b ¸ wmin:
Then, I have the following.
Proposition 2 Setting wmin > 0 could improve the expected social welfare in the cases of
Case 1 and Case 4, while it deﬁnitely damages the equilibrium expected social welfare in the
cases of Case 2 and Case 3.
An increase in wmin tightens the LL constraint of wb ¸ 0, and consequently lowers the targeted
effort level in ﬁrm 0 so long as the IR constraint is binding. Thus setting wmin > 0, reducing
the targeted effort level in ﬁrm 0, could improve the expected social welfare in the cases of
Case 1 and Case 4. People often consider that managers in some state-owned ﬁrms are less
responsible to bad performances. The result implies, however, that the less responsibility can
be desirable from the viewpoint of expected social welfare.
4 Concluding Remarks
When the taxation for the wage payments is costly, the government has an incentive to reduce
the wage payments. In this case, the limited liability of bureaucratic managers can cause an
agency problem, which results in reducing the targeted effort levels in the state-owned ﬁrm re-
spondingtoanyeffortlevelsinprivateﬁrms. However, eitherwhentheprivateowner’sstrategy
is substitute to the government’s one and is under-investment from the viewpoint of expected
social welfare or when the private owner’s strategy is complement to the government’s one
and is over-investment from the viewpoint of expected social welfare, the distortion due to
the agency problem could improve the expected social welfare through an strategic interaction
between the government and private owner. Therefore, when the reform (or privatization) of
state-owned ﬁrms is considered, this type of innovative interaction should be also examined.
I also investigate the effect of a bureaucratic system concerning a minimum wage level.
Ordinarily, setting minimum wage level higher is considered as a system for guaranteeing a
lowest life level ex-post. However, it also has an effect to tighten the constraint of minimum
wage and cause the agency problem more likely. Therefore, when a slight degree of agency
problem improves the expected social welfare, a positive level of minimum wage is optimal
even from the ex-ante viewpoint. It is often considered that managers in certain state-owned
ﬁrms are less responsible to bad performances. My result implies, however, that the less
responsibility can be desirable from the viewpoint of expected social welfare.
7It seems to be expedient to assume that committing to systems is sustainable, although committing to con-
tracts is not. However, I consider that designing a system requires very complex political procedures and that the
government cannot change the system in the short run.
5Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Obvious following from the explanation in the text.
(ii) When the IR constraint is held with equality, the expected social welfare given a level
of e1 is written as
E[Z
s j e0;e1] ¡ e0 ¡ e1 ¡ ³(e0 + w):
Obviously, when the LL constraints are not imposed, the IR constraint is held with equality in














= 1 + ³:


















(¸ ¡ ³)v(r0) + °v
0(r0) = 0; (A2)
(¸ ¡ ³)(1 ¡ v(r0)) ¡ °
0v
0(r0) · 0; (A3)
where ¸ ¸ 0 and ° ¸ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers on the IR and IC constraints, re-
spectively. Note that the constraint wg ¸ 0 is never binding and then (A2) holds since I have
wg > wb following from the equation of the IC constraint and the assumptions on v(e). The
ﬁrst condition (A1) is reduced by using the equation of the IC constraint. When the constraint
wb ¸ 0 is not binding, (A3) holds with equality, which implies ¸ = ³ and ° = 0. In this case,
the result is equivalent to that without the LL constraints.
When the constraint wb ¸ 0 is slightly binding, ° is slightly larger than 0 and ¸ is slightly
smaller than ³. Then it is possible to be ° > 0 and ¸ > 0. In this case, the optimum effort level
given e1 is less than that in the cases where the LL constraints are not imposed or not binding
and the IR constraint is held with equality.






















is the private owner’s response function derived from the ﬁrst-order condition for the private
owner’s problem. Let (ed
0;ed
1) be the set of equilibrium effort levels in the cases where the LL
constraints are not imposed or not binding. Then the effect of marginal reduction in e0 from
ed
































6Table 1: In this table the equilibrium valuables under an example with with a = 10, b = 0:2,
µg = 0, µb = 1, and ³ = 0:1 is presented. Obviously, these valuables satisfy the conditions for
Case 1.
s = gg s = gb s = bg s = bb
Zs 43.01 41.38 37.03 34.28
¼s
1 1.877 0.373 4.224 1.678
CSs + ¼s




de0 is negative (positive) in the case of Case 1 and Case 2 (Case 3 and Case 4) and
the value of the terms in the brackets is positive (negative) in the case of Case 1 and Case 3
(Case 2 and Case 4). Therefore, ¡
dEW(ed
0)
de0 is positive (negative) in the case of Case 1 and Case
4 (Case 2 and Case 3).
A.2 An example of Case 1
Firm 0 and ﬁrm 1 produce a homogeneous good and the inverse demand function of the good
is p(Q) = a ¡ Q. Producing a quantity q costs 1
2bq2 + µq, where µ is either µg or µb (0 · µg <
µb < a. One dollar of production cost in ﬁrm 0 requires ³ dollar of taxation cost. Then in the






















with respect to q0, and the private owner maximizes









with respect to q1, where Q = q0 + q1, and µk and µl are the parameter of technology for ﬁrm
0 and ﬁrm 1 respectively. Assume
(1 + ³)ab + (1 + ³)µ
k ¡ (1 + b + ³b)µ
l ¸ 0:
Then I can show Zkg > Zkb, Zgl > Zbl, and ¼
kg
1 > ¼kb
















0 for k 2 fg;bg
These results implies that it is the case of Case 1 under this speciﬁcation. I omit the proof of
these results but provide an numerical example with a = 10, b = 0:2, µg = 0, µb = 1, and
³ = 0:1, instead (See Table 1).
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